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HASTA LA VISTA? AN ASSESSMENT OF THE 
CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR’S PROPOSAL TO 
SEND UNDOCUMENTED INMATES TO MEXICO 
Steven H. Joseph* 
Abstract: At a press conference in January 2010, California Governor Ar-
nold Schwarzenegger proposed sending undocumented inmates from Cal-
ifornia prisons to cheaper, privately run prisons in Mexico as a solution to 
the state’s budget crisis and prison overcrowding problems. Though seem-
ingly far-fetched, the Governor’s proposal represents a creative solution to 
a nation-wide problem of growing illegal immigrant populations, overbur-
dened penal systems, and increasing pressures to cut costs. National trends 
in privatization and the offshoring of government functions make export-
ing inmates to lower cost prisons abroad a tempting remedy, albeit one 
that is fraught with legal complications. This Note argues that the Califor-
nia Governor’s proposal is infeasible because it does not fit within the ex-
isting U.S.-Mexico treaty structure and California is constitutionally pro-
hibited from entering into its own treaty with Mexico. Furthermore, the 
massive civil liability risk created by a private extra-territorial prison sub-
stantially reduces the cost savings incentives. 
Introduction 
 In the 1987 film The Running Man, Arnold Schwarzenegger plays a 
prisoner forced to take part in a gruesome television game show, in 
which convicted felons compete against deadly gladiator-like “stalkers” 
for their freedom.1 Now, as the governor of California, Arnold Schwar-
zenegger has proposed a similarly “creative solution” to the state’s over-
stretched budget and overcrowded prison problems—send inmates 
who are illegal immigrants across the border to new and cheaper pris-
ons in Mexico.2 
 In January 2010, Governor Schwarzenegger responded to a re-
porter’s request for examples of “reckless state spending [Schwar-
                                                                                                                      
* Steven Joseph is a Note Editor for the Boston College International & Comparative Law 
Review. The author would like to thank his wife, Lauren, for her support and patience. 
1 The Running Man (Braveworld Productions 1987). 
2 Jim Carlton, Schwarzenegger’s Novel Spending Cut: Send Inmates South, Wall St. J. Blogs: Wash- 
ington Wire ( Jan. 27, 2010, 7:32 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2010/01/27/schwarz- 
eneggers-novel-spending-cut-send-inmates-south/. 
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zenegger] would like to curtail” by suggesting that the state reduce its 
prison expenses by building prisons in Mexico to house illegal immi-
grant inmates3: “We pay them to build a prison down in Mexico and 
then we have those undocumented immigrants be down there . . . [i]t 
will halve the costs to build the prisons and halve the costs to run the 
prisons.”4 The Governor’s spokesman was quick to point out that this 
was not a formal proposal,5 and the idea has already drawn criticism 
from politicians and the press.6 The California Governor is not the 
first, however, to propose sending undocumented inmates to cheaper 
prisons in Mexico.7 Arizona, another state grappling with illegal immi-
gration problems, proposed a similar plan in 19978 and was still con-
sidering it as late as 2005.9 
                                                                                                                     
  Governor Schwarzenegger has proposed a novel solution to a dire 
problem that warrants consideration; in March 2009, the California 
State Corrections Secretary Matthew Cate complained that the state 
prison system is “out of room . . . and out of money.”10 California is un-
der a federal court order to spend hundreds of millions of dollars to 
upgrade its prisons and reduce its prison population by 40,000 inmates 
within the next two years.11 With time running out, California is in des-
perate need of innovative solutions to its financial and penological 
problems.12 
 Meanwhile, the dual forces of shrinking state budgets and eco-
nomic globalization have driven governments to outsource state func-
tions to private service providers abroad.13 These government contracts 
 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 John Diaz, Editorial, Have the Governor’s Senses Headed South?, S.F. Chron., Jan. 27, 
2010, at A13. 
7 See James Brooke, With Jail Costs Rising, Arizona Wants to Build Private Prison in Mexico, 
N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1997, at 1 (detailing Arizona’s 1997 proposal to send undocumented 
prisoners to a privately run prison in Mexico). 
8 Id. 
9 Arizona Governor Vetoes Measures on Immigration, N.Y. Times, May 22, 2005, available at 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C04E7DB1539F931A15756C0A9639C8
B63. 
10 Jennifer Steinhauer, To Trim Costs, States Relax Hard Line on Prisons, N.Y. Times, Mar. 
25, 2009, at A1. 
11 Carlton, supra note 2; Diaz, supra note 6. 
12 See Carlton, supra note 2; Diaz, supra note 6. 
13 Michael A. Zuckerman, Note, The Offshoring of American Government, 94 Cornell L. 
Rev. 165, 168 (2008). 
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have created some cost savings,14 but the concept of sending essential 
state functions to be carried out abroad has caused political contro-
versy.15 In 2004, the California State Auditor surveyed thirty-five select 
state agencies and five University of California campuses with medical 
facilities and found that in 185 state contracts, which were worth a total 
of $638.9 million, at least some of the work was being performed off 
shore.16 Even if California does not implement the Governor’s plan to 
send illegal immigrant prisoners to Mexico, national trends of privatiza-
tion and offshoring,17 combined with growing populations of illegal 
immigrants18 and prisoners,19 would likely tempt other states to con-
sider similar proposals in the near future.20 
 This Note examines the feasibility of implementing the Governor’s 
proposal to move undocumented inmates to prisons in Mexico. Part I 
introduces the situation facing the U.S. and Californian penal systems. 
Part II discusses the existing U.S.-Mexico prisoner transfer treaty and 
individual states’ ability to act internationally. Part II also explains the 
constitutional rights and remedies of individuals detained by U.S. citi-
zens or agents outside the borders of the United States. Part III then 
analyzes the Governor’s proposal in light of the existing international 
legal institutions, as well as the potential liability facing state contractors 
in Mexico and the associated costs facing the state itself. Finally, the 
Note concludes that Governor Schwarzenegger’s proposal is not practi-
cable because it does not fit within the existing U.S.-Mexico treaty 
                                                                                                                      
14 Id. at 173 (noting that New York City awarded a contract for environmental citation 
processing to a Delaware-based firm that subcontracted the work to Ghana, “where typists 
typically earn about $70 per month . . . .”); see id. at 172 (noting that Indiana awarded a 
contract to upgrade a state agency’s computers to an Indian firm whose bid was $8 million 
below the next lowest bid). 
15 Id. at 172, 173–74 (describing Senator Ted Kennedy’s criticism of then-governor 
Mitt Romney for “jumping on the offshoring bandwagon” and the public debate over off-
shoring that took place during the 2004 presidential election). 
16 Cal. State Auditor, Bureau of State Audits, The State’s Offshore Contract-
ing: Uncertainty Exists About Its Prevalence and Effects 1 (2005). The report notes, 
however, that state agencies are not required to track or report their offshore contracting, so 
the full extent to which California outsources its public functions to offshore contractors is 
unclear. Id. 
17 See Zuckerman, supra note 13, at 168. 
18 Solomon Moore, Hispanics Are Largest Ethnic Group in Federal Prisons, Study Shows, N.Y. 
Times, Feb. 19, 2009, at A14 [hereinafter Hispanics]. 
19 See Lucas Anderson, Kicking the National Habit: The Legal and Policy Arguments for Abol-
ishing Private Prison Contracts, 39 Pub. Cont. L.J. 113, 114 (2009). 
20 Cf. Brooke, supra note 7 (detailing Arizona’s 1997 proposal to send undocumented 
prisoners to a privately run prison in Mexico). 
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structure; additionally, the massive civil liability risk created by an extra-
territorial prison substantially reduces the cost savings incentives. 
I. Background 
 Prison populations and costs in the United States have sky rock-
eted in recent years.21 The U.S. prison population increased tenfold in 
the last four decades,22 reaching over 2 million in 2008.23 Including 
individuals on parole or probation, there were a total of 7.3 million 
people in the United States in the penal system in 2008, costing the 
United States $47 billion.24 
                                                                                                                     
 A 2007 study of federal prisons revealed that Latinos constituted 
one-third of federal prisoners but comprised only thirteen percent of 
the U.S. population— “a result the study attributed to the sharp rise in 
illegal immigration and tougher enforcement of immigration laws.”25 
Illegal immigration has increased from 3.9 million new illegal immi-
grants in 1992 to 11.9 million by 2008.26 Legal and illegal immigrants 
also compose seventeen percent of California’s adult prison popula-
tion.27 Furthermore, “of the 20,000 undocumented inmates [in Cali-
fornia]—about 68 percent . . . are from Mexico.”28 The large propor-
tion of immigrant prisoners in the United States has “become a major 
domestic and international issue.”29 
 In addition to immigration, global integration of trade and politics 
has fostered a globalized approach to criminal justice.30 The United 
States signed a treaty with Mexico in 1976 to permit voluntary prisoner 
 
21 See Anderson, supra note 19; Solomon Moore, Study Shows High Cost of Criminal Cor-
rections, N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 2009, at A13 (describing state and national growth in prison 
spending) [hereinafter High Cost]. 
22 Anderson, supra note 19. 
23 Id. 
24 High Cost, supra note 21. 
25 Hispanics, supra note 18. 
26 Id. 
27 Eumi K. Lee, An Overview of Special Populations in California Prisons, 7 Hastings Race 
& Poverty L.J. 223, 230 (2010). 
28 Diaz, supra note 6. 
29 Mark Andrew Sherman, Book Review, 28 Geo. Wash. J. Int’l L. & Econ. 495, 495 
(1995) (reviewing Michal Plachta, Transfer of Prisoners Under International In-
struments and Domestic Legislation: A Comparative Study (1993)). 
30 See David S. Finkelstein, “Ever Been in a [Foreign] Prison?”: The Implementation of Transfer 
of Penal Sanctions Treaties by U.S. States, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 125, 137 (1997) (“[T]he NAFTA 
agreement signifies the beginning of a larger economic integration and globalization; these 
economic forces can combine with political integration to bring about supranational ap-
proaches to cooperation in criminal law and, specifically, the transfer of prisoners.”). 
2011] Offshoring U.S. Prisons to Mexico 177 
transfers.31 This Treaty has “served as a model” for numerous subse-
quent bilateral and multilateral prisoner transfer agreements with oth-
er countries.32 The United States also has extradition agreements with 
over a hundred countries, which require the parties to apprehend for-
eign nationals within their borders and hand them over to stand trial 
for alleged crimes abroad.33 
 On top of the challenges posed by illegal immigration and growing 
prison populations, tighter state budgets have left policymakers scram-
bling for ways to cut costs.34 In recent decades, politicians who wanted 
to show that they were tough on crime implemented mandatory mini-
mum sentences that drastically increased prison populations and ex-
penses.35 Most states have now reduced sentences and costly parole 
programs,36 but others have taken more drastic measures.37 
 Many states are now privatizing prisons and exporting inmates to 
reduce prison costs and overcrowding.38 In 2007, the New York Times 
reported that “[c]hronic prison overcrowding has corrections officials 
in Hawaii and at least seven other states looking increasingly across 
state lines for scarce prison beds, usually in prisons run by private com-
panies.”39 At that time, California was planning to send over 8,000 pris-
oners out of state.40 This approach has been politically popular because 
it reduces prison overcrowding without the need to increase taxes, issue 
bonds, or hold a referendum.41 
                                                                                                                      
31 Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences, U.S.-Mex., Nov. 25, 1976, 28 U.S.T. 
7399 (entered into force Nov. 30, 1977) [hereinafter Treaty]. 
32 Ronald M. Emanuel, Intervention of Constitutional Powers: The Prisoner Transfer Treaties, 
2 Fla. Int’l L.J. 203, 204 (1986). 
33 José A. Cabranes, Our Imperial Criminal Procedure: Problems in the Extraterritorial Appli-
cation of U.S. Constitutional Law, 118 Yale L.J. 1660,1680 (2009). 
34 See Steinhauer, supra note 10 (quoting the President of the National Council on 
Crime and Delinquency: “[W]hen dollars are as tight as they are now, you have to make 
really tough choices”). 
35 See id. 
36 Id. 
37 See Solomon Moore, States Export Their Inmates as Prisons Fill, N.Y. Times, July 31, 
2007, at A1 (“Chronic prison overcrowding has corrections officials in Hawaii and at least 
seven other states looking increasingly across state lines for scarce prison beds, usually in 
prisons run by private companies.”) [hereinafter States Export]. 
38 See id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 See Anderson, supra note 19, at 115. 
178 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 34:173 
 Both corrections officials42 and the legal community,43 however, 
have criticized prison privatization and inmate exports. “[E]xcessive 
prisoner churn” reduces access to training programs.44 Private prisons 
have also raised concerns about the legitimacy of delegating “inher-
ently governmental function[s]” to private parties.45 
 Private prisons are part of a larger national trend of privatizing 
public functions, and some states and government contractors are now 
sending contracts for public services abroad to further reduce costs.46 
Privatization, or contracting with the private sector to perform public 
functions, began in the 1980s and increased through the 1990s.47 In 
2008, state and local governments in the United States spent $12 billion 
on outsourcing, which is expected to increase to $20 billion by 2011.48 
Offshoring, the practice of relocating all or part of an entity’s opera-
tions to a foreign country, has been a prominent trend in the private 
sector, and it is now “creeping . . . into the arena of government.”49 Re-
liable data on public sector offshoring is lacking, but national estimates 
of state spending range from $2 to 3.8 billion.50 
 Most states now offshore public services to some degree, although 
the extent of this practice varies greatly across states.51 According to a 
study by the Government Accountability Office in 2006, forty-three out 
of fifty states offshored some portion of their work related to child sup-
port enforcement, food stamps, temporary assistance for needy fami-
lies, and unemployment insurance.52 Within those programs, states 
most frequently delegated customer service and information technol-
ogy functions to offshore contractors.53 India and Mexico were the 
                                                                                                                      
42 See States Export, supra note 37 (discussing concerns raised by prison officials about “ex-
cessive prisoner churn, consistency among private vendors and safety in some prisons”). 
43 See Anderson, supra note 19, at 117 (criticizing private prisons in the Public Contract 
Law Journal published by the American Bar Association). 
44 States Export, supra note 37. 
45 See Anderson, supra note 19, at 121–25. Anderson argues: “When a private company 
assumes responsibility for the administration of inmate punishment and rehabilitation, it 
improperly undertakes to perform an inherently public discretionary function at the ex-
pense of inmates’ fundamental liberty interests.” Id. at 115–16. 
46 See Zuckerman, supra note 13, at 168. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 169. 
51 Id. at 170. 
52 Gov’t Accountability Office, Offshoring in Six Human Services Programs 
2–3 (2006). 
53 Id. at 17–20. For detailed examples of state and municipal offshoring, see Zucker-
man, supra note 13, at 171–73. 
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most common recipients of offshore government contracts, but public 
functions were also offshored to Argentina, Canada, Chile, France, Ire-
land, Poland, and Spain.54 One scholar writes that “state officials rarely 
contracted directly with foreign companies; instead, offshoring gener-
ally occurred when state contractors either hired foreign subcontrac-
tors or used their own offshore operations.”55 
 Although Governor Schwarzenegger’s proposal to offshore correc-
tional services directly to a foreign contractor is unusual,56 he is not the 
first American governor to propose offshoring as a solution to a state 
budget and prison overcrowding problem.57 In 1997, Governor Fife 
Symington of Arizona proposed building a privately-run prison in Mex-
ico to house the majority of the state’s Mexican prisoners.58 Under the 
proposal, Mexican inmates would be transferred to a private prison in 
Mexico run “according to American standards, just the way major 
American corporations operate in Mexico.”59 The Chief Operating Of-
ficer of a private prison corporation estimated that by taking advantage 
of lower labor costs, the state could run the prison for half of what it 
would cost in the United States.60 Although state officials were confi-
dent that the proposal would survive any legal challenges,61 Arizona 
Governor Janet Napolitano eventually vetoed the proposal in 2005.62 
 Transferring Mexican inmates to prisons in Mexico is an attractive 
prospect for both the state and the prisoners.63 Labor constitutes sev-
enty percent of prison expenses, and the cost of labor in Mexico is sub-
stantially lower than in the United States.64 For the Mexican inmates, 
repatriation for the remainder of their sentence has many benefits— 
familiar language and food, as well as easier access to family.65 Fur-
thermore, “Mexican prisons are much more lenient in the area of fam-
                                                                                                                      
54 Gov’t Accountability Office, supra note 52, at 21–22. 
55 Zuckerman, supra note 13, at 171 (internal quotations omitted). 
56 See supra notes 53, 55 and accompanying text (explaining that offshored functions 
are typically in the fields of IT services and customer service and that states rarely directly 
contract with a foreign service provider). 
57 Brooke, supra note 7. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Arizona Governor, supra note 9. 
63 See Brooke, supra note 7 (describing benefits of lower prison operating costs in Mexico 
and the benefits of easier access to family and familiar language and food for prisoners). 
64 See id. 
65 Id. 
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ily visitation and, unlike most U.S. correctional institutions, Mexican 
prisons permit conjugal visits.”66 
 Despite these apparent benefits and privileges, Mexico has a poor 
reputation for its treatment of prisoners.67 High profile cases of Ameri-
cans incarcerated in Mexico and investigations by the State Department 
in the 1990s revealed widespread physical abuse of prisoners, extortion, 
and corruption.68 Prisons are often overcrowded, and prisoners de-
pend on relatives to supply them with food.69 A large and violent prison 
population combined with insufficient security leads to dozens of 
deaths each year in violent prison riots70—all of these facts illustrate the 
need for legislators to evaluate Governor Schwarzenegger’s proposal 
cautiously before agreeing to send California inmates to prisons across 
the border without their consent.71 
                                                                                                                     
II. Discussion 
A. International Law 
 The California Governor’s proposal is not the only means by which 
prisoners could be transferred internationally; there is already a treaty 
governing prisoner transfers between the United States and Mexico.72 
The Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences (Treaty) was enacted 
in 1977 as a response to reports that U.S. citizens incarcerated in Mex-
ico were subjected to inhumane treatment and corrupt prison condi-
tions.73 The Treaty was intended to resolve both the heavily publicized 
 
66 Liana E. Olivarez, Comment, The Mexican-American Prisoner Transfer Treaty: Current 
Problems and Solutions, 30 Tex. Int’l L.J. 395, 402 (1995). 
67 See Diaz, supra note 6 (“Prison management is not exactly Mexico’s strong suit.”). 
68 See Abraham Abramovsky, Transfer of Penal Sanctions Treaties: An Endangered Species?, 
24 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 449, 454–55 (1991) (describing incidents of physical abuse in 
Mexican prisons uncovered by State Department investigation in 1976); Olivarez, supra 
note 66, at 404–06 (detailing high-profile cases of Americans incarcerated in Mexico). 
69 See Diaz, supra note 6 (highlighting prison conditions depicted in the documentary 
Presumed Guilty (Abogados con cámara 2009)). 
70 See Elisabeth Malkin, Gang Brawl Inside Mexico Prison Leaves 23 Dead, N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 
2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/21/world/americas/21mexico.html?scp 
=1&sq=gang%20brawl%20inside%20mexico%20prison&st=cse (reporting “the latest in a string 
of violent flare-ups in Mexico’s penal system . . . .”). 
71 See Carlton, supra note 2 (“‘Think about it,’ Schwarzenegger said. ‘California give 
[sic] Mexico the money . . . We pay them to build a prison down in Mexico and then we 
have those undocumented immigrants be down there in a prison with their prison guards 
and all this.”) (ellipsis in original). 
72 See Treaty, supra note 31. 
73 See Abramovsky, supra note 68, at 454–55. 
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humanitarian concerns, as well as the diplomatic tension caused by the 
public outcry.74 
 Specifically, the Treaty permits Mexican nationals sentenced in the 
United States to serve their sentence in Mexico, and vice-versa,75 in or-
der to promote the “social rehabilitation of the offender.”76 Consistent 
with this humanitarian purpose, the Treaty states that “[t]he Receiving 
State shall not be entitled to any reimbursement for the expenses in-
curred by it in the completion of the offender’s sentence.”77 
 Transfers are subject to a number of conditions.78 The Treaty re-
quires the crime to be punishable in both states.79 Furthermore, the 
offense for which the offender was convicted and sentenced cannot be 
a “political offense” or “an offense under the immigration . . . laws of a 
party.”80 Additionally, the offender “must be a national of the Receiving 
State”81 and not a “domiciliary of the Transferring State.”82 
 Procedurally, transfers are initiated by the authority of the trans-
ferring country through diplomatic channels, though the offender may 
submit a request to the authority where he or she is held.83 Exercising 
the Treaty requires the consent of: the federal authority of the receiv-
ing country; the federal authority of the transferring country; the au-
thority of the transferring state, if sentenced by a state court; and the 
consent of the offender.84 
 Once transferred, the offender’s sentence is “carried out accord-
ing to the laws and procedures of the Receiving State.”85 Furthermore, 
under Article VI of the Treaty, the “[t]ransferring State [retains] exclu-
sive jurisdiction over any proceedings, regardless of their form, in-
tended to challenge, modify or set aside sentences handed down by its 
courts.”86 U.S. courts have interpreted the offender’s consent to consti-
                                                                                                                      
74 Olivarez, supra note 66, at 396–97. 
75 Treaty, supra note 31, art. I. 
76 Id. art. IV(4). 
77 Id. art. V(4). 
78 Id. art. II. 
79 Id. art. II(1); see Sherman, supra note 29, at 519–20 (explaining the principle of 
double criminality). 
80 Treaty, supra note 31, art. II(4). 
81 Id. art. II(2). 
82 Id. art. II(3). 
83 Id. art. IV(1)–(2). 
84 Id. art. IV(2)–(3), (5). 
85 Id. art. V(2). 
86 Treaty, supra note 31, art. VI. 
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tute a waiver of the right to challenge the foreign conviction in U.S. 
courts.87 
 The Treaty does not prescribe a procedure for consent, but it does 
permit the receiving country to “verify, prior to the transfer, that the 
offender’s consent to the transfer is given voluntarily and with full 
knowledge of the consequences thereof . . . .”88 The U.S. implementing 
legislation requires a hearing before a U.S. magistrate to verify that the 
offender’s consent is “voluntary and with full knowledge of the conse-
quences.”89 The courts have also required that the offender “have ac-
cess to competent council.”90 
 The Treaty requires implementing legislation.91 Even though the 
Treaty acknowledges the federal nature of Mexico and the United 
States,92 individual states cannot be party to the Treaty.93 Therefore, the 
federal government and each state must enact separate pieces of ena-
bling legislation.94 To effect an international prisoner transfer, a state 
must transfer the prisoner to the federal government, and the federal 
government may then transfer the individual to his or her home coun-
try.95 
 California’s current implementing legislation is particularly proac-
tive in encouraging prisoners to take advantage of the transfer option.96 
The state’s legislation requires the appropriate agency to “devise a me-
thod of notifying each foreign born inmate . . . that he or she may be 
eligible to serve his or her term of imprisonment in his or her nation of 
citizenship”97 and to “actively encourage each eligible foreign born in-
                                                                                                                      
87 See Pfeifer v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 615 F.2d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 1980) (“[T]he Treaty 
and its implementing legislation provide that, prior to transfer, an offender must first con-
sent to the conditions of the Treaty. This consent constitutes a waiver of, or at least an 
agreement not to assert, any constitutional rights the offender might have regarding his or 
her [foreign] conviction. The issue is whether this consent is obtained in a manner that 
meets the constitutional tests for a valid waiver.”). 
88 Treaty, supra note 31, art. V(1). 
89 18 U.S.C. § 4107 (2006). 
90 Pfeifer, 615 F.2d at 876. 
91 See Treaty, supra note 31, art. IV(9). 
92 See id. art. IV(5) (“If the offender was sentenced by the courts of a state of one of the 
Parties, the approval of the authorities of that state, as well as that of the Federal Authority, 
shall be required.”). 
93 See Finkelstein, supra note 30, at 143. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 See id. at 150 (“California is the only state other than New York which has enabling 
legislation that formally addresses the prisoner’s ability to obtain information regarding 
his options and the possibility of transfer under an international treaty.”). 
97 Cal. Penal Code § 2912(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2010). 
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mate to apply” for a transfer.”98 Between 1994 and 2004, California 
went so far as to offer up to $2000 to receiving states for each year that 
they held a transferred prisoner.99 
 Overall use of the Treaty has decreased in recent years.100 In the 
first fourteen years following the Treaty’s enactment, 968 U.S. citizens 
and 577 Mexican citizens transferred their sentence to their home 
country pursuant to the Treaty.101 From the period between 1990 and 
1995, however, California had transferred only four Mexican citizens 
pursuant to the Treaty.102 
 The United States is party to numerous prisoner transfer treaties 
and processes around 1500 transfer applications per year.103 Most pris-
oners are transferred from the federal penal system, and Mexicans 
compose a large portion of total transfers.104 On average, the United 
States denies approximately sixty percent of transfer applications; Mex-
ican applicants have the highest denial rate because their status as do-
miciliaries of the United States often renders them ineligible for trans-
fer.105 Of the prisoners transferred out of the United States pursuant to 
transfer treaties, it is reasonable to assume that very few are Mexican 
citizens from California state prisons.106 
 Despite California’s proactive efforts in the field of international 
prisoner transfers, states are actually quite limited in their ability to act 
internationally.107 Article I, § 10 of the U.S. Constitution explicitly with-
holds the Treaty Power from the states.108 The third clause states: “No 
State shall, without the consent of Congress . . . enter into any Agree-
ment or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power . . . .”109 
                                                                                                                      
98 Id. § 2912(b)(1). 
99 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 416 (West) (enacting $2000 payment), amended by 2004 
Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 924 (West) (repealing $2000 payment). 
100 See Olivarez, supra note 66, at 406. 
101 Abramovsky, supra note 68, at 452. 
102 Olivarez, supra note 66, at 406. 
103 Paula Wolff, The International Prisoner Transfer Program, Immigration Daily, http:// 
www.ilw.com/articles/2007,0515-wolff.shtm (last visited Oct. 25, 2010). 
104 Id. 
105 Id; see Treaty, supra note 31, art. II(3) (“[T]he offender [must] not be a domiciliary 
of the Transferring State.”). 
106 See Wolff, supra note 103 (explaining that most transfers come from federal, not 
state, convictions and that Mexicans have the highest application denial rate). 
107 Leanne M. Wilson, The Fate of the Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause After Garamendi 
and Crosby, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 746,776 (2007) (describing the preemptive power of ex-
ecutive actions and statements); see id. at 771–72 (explaining the limits imposed on states 
by the “one voice” principle). 
108 See U.S. Const. art. 1, § 10, cls. 1 & 3. 
109 Id. cl. 3. 
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Known as the “Compact Clause,” this provision has been broadly inter-
preted to permit states to enter into some compacts, as long as they are 
not binding or do not “[i]nappropriately enhance the political power 
of the states.”110 
 The Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause and the principles of 
preemption also limit the ability of states to act in the international 
realm.111 The Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause is an expansion of 
the Dormant Interstate Commerce Clause derived from Article I of the 
Constitution.112 Under the Dormant Interstate Commerce Clause, state 
action is invalid if it discriminates against out-of-state commerce either 
facially or by effect, or if it unduly burdens interstate commerce.113 The 
Dormant Interstate Commerce Clause has been applied to interna-
tional commerce as well, based on a “fear of states interfering with the 
nation’s foreign affairs, resulting in harm to the nation from the re-
taliatory actions of foreign governments.”114 The foreign application of 
the dormant commerce clause is intended to promote uniformity in 
the treatment of foreign nations and to permit the federal government 
to present a single uniform policy towards international trading part-
ners.115 
 The Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause’s exact scope is ambigu-
ous, but it generally prohibits states from interfering with federal com-
merce.116 In the most recent cases addressing the international activi-
ties of the states, the Supreme Court has applied the principles of the 
Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause; however, the Court ultimately re-
solved both cases on preemption grounds.117 In Crosby v. National For-
eign Trade Council, the Court struck down a Massachusetts law directed 
at trade with Burma because it interfered with authority Congress had 
                                                                                                                      
110 Jeremy K. Schrag, Note, A Federal Framework for Regulating the Growing International 
Presence of the Several States, 48 Washburn L.J. 425, 433–34 (2009). 
111 See Wilson, supra note 107, at 771–72, 776. 
112 Id. at 753 (explaining the origins and basis of the Dormant Foreign Commerce 
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113 Id. at 749–50. 
114 Id. at 753. 
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Assessing Dormant-Foreign-Commerce-Clause Limitation on the Wisconsin-China Relationship, 2009 
Wis. L. Rev. 733, 738. 
117 See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003); Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade 
Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000). 
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delegated to the President in that field.118 In American Insurance Ass’n v. 
Garamendi, the Court struck down a California law requiring insurance 
companies to disclose their dealings with Germany during the Second 
World War because the President had already taken executive action in 
that field.119 In both cases, the Court considered the “need for the na-
tion to speak with one voice in foreign affairs,” but ultimately decided 
that the federal action on the specific issues superseded the conflicting 
state action.120 
 Despite these constitutional limitations, some state action in inter-
national affairs is permitted.121 Traditional state activity in the interna-
tional sphere falls into one of three categories: entering nonbinding 
agreements with foreign entities to promote trade and investment; 
adopting laws and policies pursuant to federally negotiated interna-
tional treaties; and lobbying the federal government to support the 
states’ international agenda.122 Most international state activity relates 
to promoting trade and investment.123 For example, with the approval 
of the Department of Homeland Security, Wisconsin has created a 
“special economic zone” that is designed to attract foreign investment 
by offering U.S. residency as an incentive to qualifying investors.124 Wis-
consin has also negotiated a “bilateral trading relationship” with China 
to offer favorable treatment to Chinese investors.125 Similarly, many 
states and municipalities enter “sister city” relationships, which are 
nonbinding diplomatic arrangements designed to build cultural con-
nections and encourage economic development between U.S. and for-
eign communities.126 Despite these developments, the exact limits on 
states’ international activities remain unclear.127 
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B. Extra-Territorial Liability 
 The Constitution is silent regarding its application outside U.S. 
territory; thus, it is uncertain whether prisoners held abroad under 
U.S. law can demand constitutional protections and seek civil damages 
in U.S. courts.128 In recent years, the question of whether foreign na-
tionals detained outside the United States possess any rights has sur-
faced repeatedly in the context of the War on Terror.129 Thousands of 
foreign nationals have been arrested for suspected terrorist activities 
and held with U.S. assistance in foreign states.130 Critics describe this 
practice of extra-territorial detention and interrogation as a “legal 
black hole,” where detainees possess no enforceable rights and gov-
ernments may act unconstrained by their own national laws.131 For ex-
ample, at various times during the U.S. detention of suspected terror-
ists in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, individuals were denied constitutional 
habeas corpus and due process rights, as well as the Prisoner of War 
protections guaranteed by international law.132 
 Although the law regarding prisoners’ rights is not totally clear, 
recent cases have held that foreign nationals held abroad under color 
of U.S. law do possess some constitutional rights.133 In Boumediene v. 
Bush, Justice Kennedy wrote that three factors ought to be used to de-
termine whether aliens in U.S. custody outside U.S. borders have the 
right to petition the courts for a writ of habeas corpus: “(1) the citizen-
ship and status of the detainee and the adequacy of the process 
through which that status determination was made; (2) the nature of 
the sites where apprehension and then detention took place; and (3) 
the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner’s entitlement 
to the writ.”134 The holding in Boumediene, which stipulates that Guan-
tanamo Bay detainees have habeas rights, implies that aliens in U.S. 
custody elsewhere have some constitutional rights as well.135 
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 Although the scope of constitutional rights of alien detainees re-
mains contentious, Congress has clearly prescribed causes of action for 
harms committed under the color of U.S. law, some of which have been 
applied to harm caused abroad.136 The Court’s holding in Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics created liability for 
federal employees who violated constitutional and statutory rights un-
der color of federal law,137 and the Court has suggested that such liabil-
ity extends to violations committed outside U.S. borders.138 
 Liability for constitutional torts committed by state actors is en-
shrined in 42 U.S.C. § 1983.139 Monroe v. Pape established that the stat-
ute also applies to violations of state law,140 and in Johnson v. Larabida 
Children’s Hospital, the Seventh Circuit held that the statute applied to 
private actors acting under the direction of the state or performing a 
delegated state function.141 In West v. Atkins, the Supreme Court ap-
plied this principle to individuals contracted to provide services to pris-
oners, holding that a doctor hired to treat prisoners was acting under 
state law and thus was liable for Eighth Amendment claims under 
§ 1983.142 The Court has also found § 1983 liability for violations of 
state law committed outside the state by a private agent of that state.143 
In Gwynn v. TransCor America, Inc., the court permitted a Colorado pris-
oner to bring a claim under § 1983; the prisoner alleged that her 
Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were 
violated outside of Colorado by employees contracted by the Colorado 
Department of Corrections to transport her from Oregon to Colo-
rado.144 This case law demonstrates that § 1983 could be a remedy for 
constitutional violations occurring outside the United States by private 
parties acting under state law.145 
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III. Analysis 
A. International Law 
 The Governor’s proposal to forcibly export undocumented Mexi-
can inmates to Mexican prisons would not work under the existing 
U.S.-Mexico Treaty because the Treaty requires consent,146 is expressly 
for rehabilitative purposes,147 and excludes domiciliaries of the trans-
ferring state.148 First, either eliminating the consent requirement of the 
Treaty or ignoring it, as the Governor seems to propose, would render 
both the Treaty and the transfer unconstitutional.149 A major concern 
at the drafting of the Treaty was that Americans transferred from Mex-
ico would be incarcerated under U.S. law, but without the due process 
protections guaranteed by the Constitution.150 The constitutionality of 
the present Treaty is supported by the consent requirement because it 
represents a critical waiver of due process rights.151 The elimination of 
the consent requirement from the Treaty altogether would likely ren-
der the Treaty and any nonconsensual transfers unconstitutional.152 
 Even if the Governor retained the consent requirement, comply-
ing with the required legal procedures could be prohibitively burden-
some.153 If the Governor’s plan required consent, the prisoner would 
be entitled to legal counsel,154 would have to appear before a magis-
trate judge to declare his consent,155 must receive federal approval,156 
and then would have to be transferred to federal custody to effect the 
transfer to Mexican authorities.157 Providing counsel and holding a 
magistrate hearing for the thousands of inmates that the Governor 
proposes to transfer in order to adjudicate their consent158 could be 
logistically prohibitive if the Governor intends to meet the federally 
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mandated two year deadline to ameliorate state prison conditions.159 
The dual requirements of federal consent and transfer to federal au-
thority would also allow the federal government to block the Gover-
nor’s plan or, at a minimum, add significant administrative delay.160 
                                                                                                                     
 Second, forced transfers without consent would frustrate the hu-
manitarian and rehabilitative goals and spirit of the existing Treaty.161 
Article IV of the Treaty states, “[i]n deciding upon the transfer of an 
offender the Authority of each Party shall bear in mind all factors bear-
ing upon the probability that the transfer will contribute to the social 
rehabilitation of the offender . . . .”162 Transferring prisoners purely for 
financial reasons would impermissibly ignore this term of the Treaty.163 
Consistent with Article IV’s humanitarian purpose, the Treaty also spe-
cifically disregards financial considerations.164 Article IV asserts that 
“[t]he Receiving State shall not be entitled to any reimbursement for 
the expenses incurred by it in the completion of the offender’s sen-
tence.”165 This language indicates that the drafters of the Treaty did not 
intend financial motivations or incentives to be a consideration in the 
decision to transfer or accept prisoners.166 Thus, exploitation of the 
Treaty to expand the California penal system into Mexico purely for 
financial and logistical reasons would be outside the Treaty’s scope and 
purpose.167 
 Finally, the Treaty excludes domiciliaries of the transferring state 
from eligibility.168 The Treaty defines a domiciliary as “a person who 
has been present in the territory of one of the parties for at least five 
years with an intent to remain permanently therein.”169 As stated previ-
ously, most Mexican applicants for transfer are currently ineligible be-
cause they have achieved domiciliary status in the United States.170 
 
159 Carlton, supra note 2; Diaz, supra note 6. 
160 See 18 U.S.C. § 4107; Pfeifer, 615 F.2d at 876. 
161 Clark, supra note 149, at 239. 
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163 See id. 
164 See id. arts. IV(4) (discussing “social rehabilitation” purpose of transfer) & V(4) 
(dismissing financial incentives and reimbursements, which indicates that Treaty was not 
intended to be used for profit). 
165 Id. art. IV(4). 
166 See id. 
167 See id. arts. IV(4) (indicating a humanitarian purpose through exclusive considera-
tion of factors bearing on “social rehabilitation” of the prisoner) & V(4) (indicating that 
Treaty was not intended to be used for profit by dismissing financial incentives and reim-
bursements). 
168 Treaty, supra note 31, art. II(3). 
169 Id. art. IX(4). 
170 See Wolff, supra note 103. 
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Unless the Governor also violates this provision of the Treaty, most of 
his intended transferees would not be eligible.171 
                                                                                                                     
 The existing Treaty does not permit the Governor to execute his 
proposal, and the U.S. Constitution prohibits California from drafting 
its own treaty to suit its needs.172 The Compact Clause of the Constitu-
tion prevents states from entering binding agreements with foreign na-
tions.173 Most international agreements with states survive constitu-
tional scrutiny because they are “‘nonbinding’ resolutions that call 
upon the parties to use their best efforts to facilitate trade.”174 The 
Governor’s proposal goes beyond “best efforts” and would require a 
binding compact with Mexico, which the Constitution forbids.175 
 A new agreement between California and Mexico would also vio-
late the principles of the Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause and 
would conflict with the existing federal action in the field, thus subject-
ing it to preemption.176 Under Garamendi and Crosby, a state action is 
preempted if there is a specific federal interest that conflicts with the 
state action.177 The federal government has already acted in this spe-
cific area by negotiating and ratifying a treaty with Mexico and passing 
enabling legislation.178 Therefore, California’s competing state treaty 
would be preempted because it conflicts with the existing Treaty and 
also inhibits the nation’s ability to speak to Mexico with one unified 
voice on the issue of prisoner transfers.179 
 As a last resort, California could try to lobby the federal govern-
ment to amend the existing Treaty.180 The current Treaty, however, has 
been the model for most subsequent bilateral prisoner transfer agree-
ments, so it is unlikely that the federal government would be willing to 
 
171 See id. 
172See U.S. Const. art. 1, § 10, cl. 3. 
173 Schrag, supra note 110, at 434. 
174 Id. at 447–48. 
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179 See Wilson, supra note 107, at 771–72 (explaining the “one voice” principle), 782 
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180 See Schrag, supra note 110, at 429–30. 
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depart significantly from its basic terms.181 Furthermore, any new treaty 
that did not require prisoner consent, a key element of the Governor’s 
plan to move tens of thousands of prisoners out of the country, would 
be unconstitutional.182 Given these insurmountable challenges of in-
ternational and constitutional law, Governor Schwarzenegger’s plan is 
completely untenable.183 
B. Extra-Territorial Liability 
 The feasibility of the Governor’s plan is weakened further by the 
fact that the anticipated cost savings of using private prisons in Mexico 
operated under California law would be negated by the high risk of 
costly lawsuits.184 Boumediene established that prisoners held outside the 
territorial United States under the color of U.S. law have some enforce-
able constitutional rights, specifically the right to habeas corpus.185 
Based on the three factors that the Boumediene Court enumerated and 
used to determine whether detainees had a right to habeas corpus— 
status and status certainty, location of arrest and detention, and practi-
cal obstacles—Mexican nationals transferred from California prisons to 
Mexico would have some enforceable rights, including habeas cor-
pus186 and Eighth Amendment protections.187 
 The first factor enumerated in Boumediene is status and status cer-
tainty; in that case the Court found that the uncertain status of the 
Guantanamo Bay detainees and the inadequacy of their Combatant 
Status Review Tribunals supported their claim that a writ of habeas was 
necessary in order to determine their status and rights.188 Conversely, 
in the case of California’s undocumented inmates, U.S. courts would 
have already adjudicated their criminal status prior to incarceration, 
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thus entitling them to the same habeas rights and legal protections en-
joyed by inmates of the same criminal status retained in California.189 
                                                                                                                     
 Second, whereas the Guantanamo Bay detainees were captured 
and held outside the United States at all relevant times and had to 
premise their claims to constitutional rights on Guantanamo Bay’s de 
facto status as a U.S. territory, California inmates would have spent sub-
stantial time in undisputed U.S. territory and under U.S. control.190 
Prisoners transferred to Mexico would thus have a stronger claim to 
constitutional protections than the detainees in Boumediene, given that 
California inmates would had lived on actual U.S. territory prior to 
their arrest and during their detention therein.191 
 Finally, the practical obstacles to providing enforceable rights to 
undocumented California inmates in Mexico are less severe than the 
obstacles to providing enforceable rights to Guantanamo Bay detain-
ees.192 Although issues related to distance, national borders, and the 
language barrier present substantial and costly logistical challenges to 
enforcing the rights of California prisoners transferred to Mexico, 
these challenges do not surpass the financial and national security con-
cerns that the Government put forth in Boumediene and that the Court 
ultimately rejected.193 
 In addition to the habeas rights articulated in Boumediene, Califor-
nia prisoners in Mexico would, at a minimum, also be entitled to Eighth 
Amendment protection from cruel and unusual punishment.194 The 
 
189 Cf. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 56 (1988) (“Contracting out prison medical care 
does not relieve the State of its constitutional duty to provide adequate medical treatment 
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Eighth Amendment protections, whether served under color of state law by state employ-
ees or by state contractors, prisoners would be entitled to the same rights and protections 
whether held under color of state law in California or in Mexico. See id. 
190 See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 768 (holding that the location of the detainees’ “apprehen-
sion and detention [is] technically outside the sovereign territory of the United States,” but 
that Guantanamo Bay is “[i]n a very practical sense . . . within the constant jurisdiction of the 
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191 Cf. id. at 768 (Guantanamo Bay detainees’ capture and incarceration outside the 
territorial United States is “a factor that weighs against finding they have rights under the 
Suspension Clause”). 
192 See id. at 768–69. 
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dispositive . . . . [Furthermore, t]he Government presents no credible arguments that the 
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diction to hear the detainees’ claims.”). 
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plication of the Eighth Amendment). 
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Eighth Amendment is unique in that it regulates specific conduct, and 
therefore would apply to U.S. actors and agents wherever they are.195 
 Regardless of the outer limits of the constitutional rights and pro-
tections of California prisoners detained in Mexico, these prisoners 
would have a cause of action in U.S. courts for cognizable harm done to 
them during their Mexican incarceration.196 By enacting 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983, Congress created a cause of action for violations of constitu-
tional rights committed by state actors.197 Even though state govern-
ments enjoy qualified immunity from claims arising under  § 1983,198 
the courts have extended the coverage of this statute to include viola-
tions of state law199 and the conduct of private individuals if the state 
directs their actions or empowers them to perform public functions.200 
 Section 1983 would apply to Mexican prison operators under the 
Governor’s plan because state contractors and privately run prisons 
operate as state actors.201 In West, the Supreme Court sustained a pris-
oner’s claim under § 1983 against a doctor whom it found to be acting 
under the color of state law when he treated a prisoner pursuant to a 
contract with the state prison.202 In Street v. Corrections Corp. of America, 
the Sixth Circuit applied the “public function test” to determine if the 
conduct of a private prison corporation and its employees was done 
under the color of state law for the purposes of § 1983.203 The court 
noted that “[t]he public function test requires that the private entity 
exercise powers which are traditionally exclusively reserved to the 
state.”204 The court determined that the private prison company and its 
employees could be subject to liability because they were performing a 
“traditional state function.”205 Therefore, employees of Mexican pris-
ons and others associated with the prisons would be acting under state 
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law and in performance of a traditional state function and, therefore, 
could be subject to liability under § 1983.206 
 Prisoners have also successfully brought § 1983 claims against con-
tractors acting under color of state law when the questionable conduct 
took place outside the state that had hired the contractors.207 In Gwynn, 
a female prisoner brought an action under § 1983 in the Colorado Dis-
trict Court against private contractors hired by the Colorado Depart-
ment of Corrections to transport her from Oregon to Colorado.208 The 
prisoner alleged that she was subjected to dangerous conditions, mis-
treated, and sexually assaulted throughout Oregon, California, Nevada, 
Utah, Wyoming, and Idaho.209 The court ruled that the transportation 
employees, “as agents and prison guards of the State of Colorado, pur-
suant to the contract between TransCor and the Colorado Department 
of Corrections,” were acting under the color of Colorado state law 
when they sexually assaulted the plaintiff prisoner whom they were con-
tracted to guard and transport.210 The court noted that the contractual 
relationship with Colorado would have been sufficient to justify venue 
there, even if none of the tortious conduct had occurred in the state.211 
 Thus, based on the reasoning of West and Street, which both 
opened the door to potential § 1983 liability for state prison contrac-
tors,212 as well as the Gwynn court’s extension of that liability to conduct 
outside the forum,213 privately run prisons and their employees in Mex-
ico would be subject to § 1983 liability in California courts because they 
would be acting under color of California law.214 
 The history of violence, corruption, and neglect in Mexican pris-
ons215 combined with the fact that private prisons in the United States 
have a reputation for mismanagement would create dangerous condi-
tions and a high risk of endless and exacting prisoner lawsuits against 
officials of private Mexican prisons.216 Private prisons in the United 
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States have been accused of providing inferior inmate services in order 
to maximize profits.217 Employees at private U.S. prisons also receive 
much less training than state prison employees, which has led to riots, 
injuries, and mistreatment.218 Across the border, the Mexican prison 
system has a reputation for severe mistreatment, corruption, and vio-
lence.219 The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that “deliberate indif-
ference to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate violates the 
Eighth Amendment.”220 The poor conditions in Mexican prisons,221 if 
coupled with the indifference shown in U.S. private prisons,222 would 
lead to a high risk of Eighth Amendment claims by California prisoners 
held in private prisons in Mexico.223 
 One of the primary goals of the Governor’s proposal is to reduce 
costs; however, the expenses of monitoring privately-run prisons in 
Mexico in an effort to manage risks and control liability would substan-
tially offset the perceived savings.224 The cost to private prisons of insur-
ing against and litigating these types of lawsuits would likely be passed 
on to the state through higher contract prices which would further re-
duce or eliminate any potential savings.225 
 Additionally, offshoring correctional services to Mexico would like-
ly create high political costs, especially if reports of prisoner abuse and 
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mistreatment at the hands of contracted Mexican prison operators be-
came publicized.226 Even offshored programs that created substantial 
state savings have been terminated following public outcry over send-
ing an essential state function out of the country.227 For example, the 
state of Indiana contracted with an India-based consulting firm to pro-
vide work visas for sixty-five Indian contractors to upgrade the state’s 
job placement agency’s computer system.228 The contract would have 
saved the state $8 million, but it was cancelled when the details were 
publicized.229 
 Thus, even if the international and constitutional legal barriers of 
the Governor’s prison proposal were not prohibitive, the exorbitant 
monitoring and litigation expenses,230 as well as the potential political 
backlash,231 would likely make the proposal too costly for the Governor 
to pursue.232 
Conclusion 
 Governor Schwarzenegger’s proposal to relieve California’s budget 
deficit and overcrowded prisons by sending illegal immigrant inmates 
to privately run Mexican prisons is fatally flawed. Despite its creativity, it 
is untenable under international law, and the liability expenses it would 
pass on to the state would substantially eliminate the anticipated sav-
ings. Moreover, Governor Schwarzenegger is only addressing the super-
ficial effect of two much greater underlying causes—international im-
migration and domestic criminal sentencing. Because of the inherent 
complications in addressing these effects through offshoring, attacking 
these problems at their root would likely do more to relieve prison ex-
penses and overcrowding. Instead of pressing the limits of state action 
in the international arena, California should act within the limits set by 
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the Constitution and Supreme Court. California should lobby the fed-
eral government and work with immigration authorities to stop the 
flow of undocumented immigrants into the state and to deport those 
already there. This will prevent illegal immigrants from becoming part 
of the state criminal justice system in the first place. The state should 
also revise its sentencing guidelines and promote alternative probation 
and rehabilitation programs to reduce the number of inmates in its 
prison system and their associated costs. The globalized world is in-
creasingly creating challenges and opportunities that transcend na-
tional borders and state lines: state governments must recognize, how-
ever, that sending essential public functions abroad will not always solve 
their problems at home. 
